You hold a US tech ticker. How much of it is actually a bet on Beijing?
The coupling
Is China risk really inside your position?
Yes — more than the ticker admits. A concentrated US tech holding carries China through three couplings you did not separately underwrite: the fabs and component supply that feed the hardware, the end-demand that books a chunk of revenue, and the export-control regime that can gate the product line overnight. The position reads as one company; structurally it is partly a China module.
This is the failure mode the persona keeps reframing as a “supply chain question.” It is a correlation question — the same hidden coupling we map for the US book and for the current macro environment.
The cost
What does the China leg cost when it breaks?
It costs through a curve, not a headline. China’s property activity sits 50–80% below its 2020–2021 peak in a sector that long ran near 25% of GDP, with producer prices in deflation for over three years (China Briefing, year-end review, Jan 2026). Beijing set its lowest growth target in decades at 4.5–5% for 2026 (CNN Business, 4 Mar 2026).
Weak demand resets the revenue line; a supply or export-control shock reprices the cost line and the multiple at once. For a holder at 60–90% concentration, both legs move the same position in the same session — a dynamic that compounds when a Taiwan Strait or shipping-lane event lands alongside it, as traced in the oil-conflict scenario.
Measured
What does the China leg look like when it is measured?
It looks like a known quantity instead of a background worry. You see how much of the position’s variance the China factor explains, which channel dominates, and the drawdown a plausible shock would carry to your specific allocation. Exposure you can read is exposure you can hedge or accept on purpose.
Method
How does the model isolate the China channel?
It decomposes the position into its sovereign couplings, then stresses each one separately.
The System Diagnostic — China module
Maps the supply, demand, and export-control transmission paths from China to your holding, and quantifies the conditional drawdown each carries.
Spec line: model · data · coverage · stated failure rate
Diffusion sampling over fat-tailed paths · current-cycle China macro plus your allocation · the three named channels · published 4.2% false-comfort rate — runs that understate realized tail loss, printed because a hidden error rate is the real defect. Export-policy direction is itself a live variable: Washington is recalibrating chip controls during trade talks rather than tightening (East Asia Forum, 11 Mar 2026). This is a modelled scenario, not a forecast.
Objection
“I’m not exposed to China — I hold a US name”
Domicile is not exposure. The company is American; its bill of materials, a measurable share of its demand, and its regulatory ceiling are not. The model reports the China-factor loading on your actual position — and if it is small, the document says so. Either way you stop carrying the leg blind. Where the loading is large, the tail-risk option set covers what to hedge, accept, or convert; for the failure pattern across history, see the tail-risk canon.
3 fields · 48-hour document · no call, no sequence.
Frequently asked questions
What are the top China tail risks for a concentrated tech holder?
The three that move a single ticker are a supply-chain or fab disruption, a demand collapse from the property and deflation drag, and an export-control escalation that gates the product line. Each is a separate coupling, so a single shock can hit revenue, cost, and multiple in the same session.
How does China’s supply-chain and tech exposure reach a US ticker?
It enters through the bill of materials and the fab dependency, not the domicile. A US-listed name can route a large share of its components, assembly, or leading-edge silicon through Chinese or Taiwan-Strait-adjacent capacity, so the position holds China risk it was never separately underwritten for.
How serious is China’s property and debt risk right now?
Property activity sits 50–80% below its 2020–2021 peak in a sector that ran near 25% of GDP, and producer prices have been in deflation for over three years. That is a structural demand drag on the China-facing revenue line, not a one-quarter dip.
What event would trigger a China shock to the position?
A tightening of US chip export controls, a Taiwan Strait or shipping-lane disruption, or a disorderly leg down in property and credit. Export-policy direction is itself live: Washington is currently recalibrating rather than tightening, so the trigger can move in either direction.
How do you hedge concentrated China exposure?
First measure the China-factor loading on the actual position, then size convex protection against the channel that dominates. The diagnostic carries a stated 4.2% false-comfort rate, so the hedge is sized to a known error band rather than an assumed one — exposure you can read is exposure you can hedge or accept on purpose.